neo@matrix.com
Unsubscribe alerts for an address nobody had subscribed looked like hostile traffic. The source was a hardcoded link on this site, pointing back at this site.
What happened. Repeated emails arrived: "unsubscribe requested: neo@matrix.com". One in March, then three in a week. The reasonable read was that something had been compromised, or the address was being used in phishing traffic.
What it actually was. Line 889 of content/portfolio/playground/areactor_email_lab.html, a demo page showing a preview of a confirmation email:
<a href="https://areactor.org/disconnect?target=neo%40matrix.com">
disconnect / unsubscribe here
</a>
neo@matrix.com was our own placeholder, a Matrix joke used as sample data. The demo anchor was a real link to a real endpoint. Every crawler that walked that page followed it, and /disconnect dutifully sent an email.
Every detail fits once you see it. Always the same address, because it was hardcoded. Restarting on 13 August, the day /disconnect became a live route again. One in March, when the equivalent PHP script was still running on HostGator. Increasing lately because a freshly redeployed site gets recrawled.
Two things this was not
It was not an email leak. The alert goes to help@areactor.org because our own code sends it there. No address was exposed to anyone.
It was not a failure of Cloudflare's bot protection, which was the initial suspicion. The requests were plain GETs to a URL published on our own site, from clients following a link we put there. That is indistinguishable from a human clicking, because functionally it is that. A filter that blocked it would block real readers.
The fix, at two levels
The demo anchor lost its href. It is a picture of an email; the link only needs to look like one.
More importantly, /disconnect became two steps. A GET now shows a confirmation page and sends nothing; only the POST from its button sends the alert. That fixes the whole class rather than this instance.
What would catch it sooner
Never let a GET perform an action. Bare GETs are fired by link checkers, crawlers, corporate mail scanners that fetch every URL in an incoming message, and browser prefetchers. RFC 8058 defines one-click unsubscribe as POST for precisely this reason.
And when traffic looks hostile, check whether you are the one generating it. The first question should have been "what links to this endpoint?", which grep answers in seconds.
There is a quota angle too. An unauthenticated endpoint that sends email on demand, linked from a public page, is a rate limit you do not control. The Resend free tier is 100 a day, shared with the contact form.